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before an Ohio court. But if the language of two Ohio cases"3 be
applied, the employees' reasonable expectation of re-employment appears
the probable test. So long as such a reasonable expectation existed the
strike would continue.
Rules which may be abstracted from the strike cases do not con-
stitute as sound a basis for prediction as their logical pattern might
indicate. Some of the criteria, particularly in the termination cases, are
descriptive of the case in issue and couched in language which gives them
the color of essential requirements. But careful examination yields the
idea that in many instances the elements of the strike described are not
essential to the holding, but are simply permitted by the peculiar facts
of the case. 4 With litigation in the strike area increasing in volume
and importance, existing cases are useful for the broad outlines they have
sketched. The fine lines of the strike concept are being drawn by care-
fully reasoned opinions in current cases." R. M. A.
LEGISLATION
THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 1940.
On October 17, 1940, the Federal Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 194 o' became effective. This act applies to all persons on active
duty on that date and to all who enter the service before May 15, 1945,
unless the United States is then engaged in a war, in which event the act
shall remain effective until six months after a peace treaty has been
proclaimed by the President.2 Much of the act is the same as the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918. What effect does the
new act have? What is its purpose? How does it work? What must
the man in the service do in order to enjoy its benefits? It is the purpose
of this comment to state in as concise a manner as the subject permits
the effect of this law.
Purpose
The act in no way cancels or annuls any debts or obligations; its
primary purposes are (a) to provide for a suspension of due dates on
obligations until the man in the service has had a sufficient time to
' Park Hotel v. Union, supra, n. 32; Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Clothing Workers,
supra, n. 31.4 Supra, notes 47 and 48.
reUnited States Coal Co. v. Board of Review, supra, n. 13.
1 U.S.C.A., Title So, Apx. secs. So-585 inc. For a discussion of the Act's constitu-
tionality, see A.B.A.J. for Jan. 5, 194, at p. 23, and 2 WASH. & L. L. Rsv. i at 34-
, Sees. sor (i) (z), 604.
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reestablish himself financially; (b) to give the soldier or sailor adequate
protection in suits prosecuted or which might otherwise be prosecuted
against him during the period of his enlistment; and (c) to give those
men having homestead claims, mining claims, mineral leases, desert
rights, and grazing rights on United States land certain legal rights in
order that their position shall not be prejudiced by acceptance of their
military duties. It is further provided that when stays, postponements,
and suspensions of obligations and liabilities, and the vacating or setting
aside of a judgment or decree are granted as provided for by the act,
similar benefits may, in the discretion of the court, be extended to
sureties, guarantors, endorsers, and others subject to the obligation or
liability.3
Litigation
The act, which applies to all proceedings in both federal and state
courts,' gives the man in the service protection against litigants who
would otherwise have an unfair advantage over him. In order that his
adversaries in law suits should not seize upon his absence to prejudice
his rights, the law has provided for the filing of affidavits by plaintiffs
as to defendants' whereabouts, the posting of bonds of indemnity by
plaintiffs whose causes are allowed to proceed to judgment, the appoint-
ment of attorneys to defend absentee defendants, and the vesting of
power in the courts to grant stays of all actions and proceedings to which
he is a party. If the courts interpret the law and exercise their discretion
in accord with the spirit of the act, men who are involved in litigation
during their absence should not be in a disadvantageous position as a
result of their military service.
There are two parts in which the provisions of the act relating to
litigation may be divided, that applying to default judgments and that
applying to all suits in which one of the parties is in the military service.
In regard to the former, the counsel for a plaintiff suing a defendant in
any court in which there is an expectation of taking a default judgment
should come into court with an affidavit of the plaintiff stating that the
defendant is or is not in the military service or that the plaintiff is unable
to determine such fact. The law provides that such affidavit must be
filed before any default judgment is entered.5 However, under a similar
provision in the 1918 Act, it was held that if the defendant was not in
the service at the time the affidavit should have been filed, the plaintiff's




NOTES AND COMMENTS 271
failure to file it did not affect the judgment's validity.6 The act further
provides that if there is a failure to file an affidavit showing that the
defendant is not in the service a judgment may not be entered without
first securing an order of court directing such entry.' This latter seems
to contemplate a general procedure in which the clerk is permitted to
enter a default judgment without having the entry signed by a judge.
Under the act no such judgments may be entered without first securing
the previously mentioned order of court. Such order may not be made
by the court until an attorney has been appointed by the court to repre-
sent and protect the absentee defendant's interests.' Attorneys so
appointed receive no compensation, but it is taken for granted that
all members of the bar will consider it a duty to serve. An appointed
attorney has no power to waive any right of the person for whom he
is appointed nor to bind him by his acts.9 In the cases where the court
makes such an order it may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
indemnify the defendant if it later appears that he was in the military
service and was prejudiced by the entering of the default judgment.1"
According to these provisions it appears that there still exists the possi-
bility of such judgments being entered against defendants, with a dis-
cretionary power resting in the court as to requiring the plaintiff to
post a bond of indemnity, in those jurisdictions in which the general
procedure is for the clerk to enter default judgments. On the other
hand, in those jurisdictions in which the court makes its own journal
entries without any requirement of an order to that effect, no default
judgments may be taken. Possibly the courts in the latter jurisdictions
will disregard the provision as to an "order directing such entry" and
interpret the statute to read as if it had been written to the effect that
no default judgments may be entered without such affidavits "except
on leave of court." If this should be done, these courts probably would
consider the provisions regarding appointment of attorneys and posting
of bonds of indemnity applicable to entry of default judgments as well.
If there should be a failure on the part of counsel to use these affidavits
as provided for by the law and of the courts to apply the provisions of
the act relative to bonds, absentee defendants may lose valuable rights.
The last subsection dealing with this matter gives the defendant who
'Eureka Homestead Soc. v. Clark, x45 La. 917, 83 So. 19o (1919); Wells v. Mc-
Arthur, 77 Okla. 279, 1S Pac. 322 (192o)i Bulgin v. Am. Law Book Co., 77 Okla. 11z,
i86 Pac. 941 (1920); Howie Mining Co. v. McGary, z56 Fed. 38 (i919); Alzugaray v.
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was in the military service and was thereby prejudiced from making
his defense a right to have the court that rendered the judgment open
the same. His application for reopening must be made within ninety
days after the termination of his service and in it he must show that he
has a meritorious or legal defense to the action." However, even if the
defendant succeeds in having the judgment set aside, he may gain no
advantage. There is the possibility that the plaintiff had not been
required to post a bond of indemnity at the time judgment was entered
on the order of court and that the plaintiff will at this late date, be
judgment-proof. If so, the reopening of the case has not helped
defendant's position. Furthermore, the act itself provides that the
vacating, setting aside, or reversing any judgment under the provisions
of the act shall not impair any right or title acquired by a bona fide
purchaser for value under such judgment.' 2
The second part provides that all actions or proceedings in which
one of the parties is in the military service shall be stayed for the period
of military service and three months thereafter or any part of such
period, unless it is the opinion of the court that the party is not
materially affected by reason of his military service.'" Under a subse-
quent section, in actions against men in the military service, the court
may, for a similar period, stay the execution of a judgment or order and
vacate or stay any attachment or garnishment of property, money, or
debts in the hands of another, whether before or after judgment.' This
power also is not to be exercised, if in the opinion of the court, the ability
of the defendant to comply with the order or judgment is not materially
affected by reason of his military service. In these cases the court may
act on its own motion, and it must act on application to it by the party
in the military service or someone in his behalf.'" The courts have the
further power to provide against the accrual and enforcement of fines
or penalties on contracts in which there has been a failure to comply
with the terms due to the stay granted pursuant to the act.' 6 The courts,
in granting stays, are not required to order stays for arbitrary periods
of time, but may in their discretion provide for any such terms as may
be just, even to the extent of ordering installment payments. Where
the person in military service is a codefendant with others, the plaintiff
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The period of military service is not to be included in computing the
period of time under state and federal statutes of limitation for bringing
of any action by or against any person in military service."
Rent
The provisions applicable to rent are practically the same as those
in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of i918, except that the
new law extends protection against evictions to rentals of eighty dollars,
instead of fifty dollars a month. Eviction and distress of the wife,
children or other dependents of a person during the period of his military
service are declared unlawful and punishment is provided therefor,
unless they are upon leave of court. This section is not applicable if
the agreed rent is in excess of eighty dollars per month.'9 The court
shall, on application of the defendant or his representative, stay such
court proceedings for not longer than three months, or it may make
such other orders as it deems just, unless in the opinion of the court the
ability of the tenant to pay the agreed rent is not materially affected
by reason of defendant's military service.2" The respective secretaries
of War, the Navy, and the Treasury (for the Coast Guard) are
empowered to order an allotment of the pay of a person in military
service in reasonable proportion to discharge the rent of premises occu-
pied by his wife, children or other dependents."'
Installment Purchases, Conditional Sales, Mortgages, Etc.
The courts are given broad discretionary powers to protect men in
the service against forfeiture of deposits and installments on contracts
of sale and against foreclosure of their rights on mortgages or instru-
ments of similar form.
Unless a court order has been obtained, installments and deposits
received prior to October 17, 1940 on contracts of purchase, lease or
bailment are not to be forfeited, nor may any rights be foreclosed, if
the adverse party is in the military service.22 The court is given several
alternatives in disposing of such cases. It may order repayment of the
money already paid as a condition of terminating the contract and
resuming possession of the property, it may order a stay of the proceed-
ings for a period not longer than three months after the termination of
the party's military service, or it may make such other equitable disposi-
28 Sec. 205.
Sec. 300(2).2 1Sec. 300(4).
Sec- 301 (0.
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tion of the case as is necessary to conserve the interests of the parties.
If the court thinks that the defendant's position is not materially affected
by reason of such service, the suit may proceed as usual.23 Similar stays
are permitted in connection with mortgages and trust deeds given prior
to October 17, 1940.24 All sales resulting from powers of sale or
confessed judgments, on secured obligations during the defendant's
military service or within three months thereafter, are declared invalid
unless an order or sale and return thereto made and approved by the
court has been previously granted.2" A new section was added in the
194o Act relating to proceedings to resume possession of a motor
vehicle, tractor, or the accessories of either, and providing for an
exception to the proceedings which may be stayed by an order of court.
This section prohibits the granting of any such stays where the court
finds that less than fifty per cent of the purchase price of the property
has been paid. However, in any such proceedings, the court may, before
entering an order or judgment, require the plaintiff to file a bond,
conditioned to indemnify the defendant who is in the service.2" The
parties to the contract are not prevented from modifying, terminating,
or cancelling the contract and are not prevented from agreeing to the
repossession or retention of the property, if such agreement is executed
in writing subsequent to the making of the contract and during or after
the period of military service of one of the parties.27
Life Insurance
By making proper application to the designated official, the enlisted
man can prevent his life insurance policies from lapsing for non-payment
of premiums, during the period of service and for one year thereafter.
Protection of the statute is only extended to holders of certain policies
and within the limitations stated in the act. The insurers who fail to
receive their premiums as a result of this law may obtain from the
government certificates of guaranty, in return for which the government
takes a lien on the policy.2"
The act provides that life insurance policies up to $Sooo in com-
panies required to have a reserve by statute, or which charge all policy
holders a premium to cover the special war risk of those insured persons
' Sec. 301(3).
'Sec. 302 (1), (2).
;Sec. 302(3).
Sec. 303.
"! Sec. 30 (W). Of further interest to those owning real estate in which a mortgage
has been executed under the Federal Housing Authority is the recent regulation of the
F.H.A. that each mortgagor that has availed himself of an F.H.A. mortgage may have
a thirteen month moratorium in the event that the mortgagor is called into military service.
" Secs. 407, 4o8.
who are in military service, may be protected from lapse for the non-
payment of premiums for the period of service and one year thereafter.2
Such contracts must be executed and a premium paid thereon before
October 17, 1940, or not less than thirty days before entry into the
service. Protection is not extended to any policy on which premiums
are due and unpaid for a period of more than one year when an
application for the benefits of the act is made, to any policy on which
there is an outstanding loan or other indebtedness equal to or greater
than fifty per cent of the policy's cash surrender value,"' nor to any
policy which is void or voidable if the insured is in the military service."
The insured consents when applying for the benefits of this act that
before any dividend is paid or any loan or settlement is made on his
policy, the insurance company must first obtain the written consent of
the Veterans' Administration.32 Such consent probably will not be
forthcoming unless the government can be adequately protected on its
certificate of guaranty to the insurance company after the contemplated
payment or loan is made. The insured must, within one year after
termination of military service, pay to the insurer all past due premiums
with interest at the rate provided in the policy for loans, or the policy
immediately becomes void, and the insurer must pay the insured the
cash value, deducting therefrom the amount of the government's lien
for the premium payments it has guaranteed the insurer.3" In order
for an enlisted man to apply for benefits under the act he must make
application to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs.34
Taxes
Any person in the service may file an affidavit with the tax collector
and gain a moratorium on payment of his real property taxes for a period
ending no later than six months after termination of his military service.
Payment of income taxes may also be postponed for a similar period.
In order to take advantage of the section pertaining to real property
taxes the aforementioned affidavit must be filed, stating therein the
assessment of the tax, that such is unpaid, and that by reason of the
affiant's military service, his ability to pay has been materially affected.
No sale of the property shall thereafter be made to enforce collection,
nor any other proceeding commenced in respect to the same matter,
except upon leave of court.3 The tax must be one falling due during
. Secs. 402, 405, 414.
' Sec. 402.
Sec. 413.
SSecs. 401 (1), 408.





the period of military service in respect to real property owned and
occupied for dwelling, agricultural, or business purposes by a person or
his dependents at the commencement of his period of military service,
and still so occupied by his dependents or employees.3 6 The proceedings
or sale may be stayed by the court for a period extending not more than
six months after the termination of military service, during which time
the unpaid taxes bear interest at six per cent until paid, but no other
penalty or interest may be incurred by reason of their non-payment."z
When by law such property is sold or forfeited to enforce the collection
of the tax, the owner has the right to redeem or commence an action to
redeem the property any time not later than six months after termination
of his period of service, unless the local law gives a longer period in
which to redeem."8
Collection of income tax falling due prior to or during the time of
military service is deferred for a period extending not more than six
months after discharge if ability to pay such tax is materially impaired
by reason of such service. No interest or penalty accrues during this
period of deferment. The running of any statute of limitation against
the "collection of such tax is suspended for the period of military service
and for an additional period of nine months.3 9
Homestead and Mining Entries
There are specific provisions in the act against forfeiture of rights
acquired prior to entering the service by holders of homestead entries,
lessees of mining and mineral lands of the United States, permittees or
licensees of grazing lands, and holders of desert-land entries. 0 The
effect is to make the period of military service equivalent to the time of
occupation or the requisite improvement. In all such cases the act
provides for the notification of the proper federal authority by the person
in the service of his desire to take advantage of the benefits provided
for under the act.
Administrative Remedies
It is provided in the act that in any civil proceeding to enforce a
right where it is made to appear that any interest, property or contract
has been transferred since October 17, 194o, with intent to delay the
just enforcement of such right by taking advantage of the act, the court
20 Sec. 500(1).
37Sec. 500 (2), (4)"
2 0Sec. 500(3).
So Sec. 5 13.
'oSecs. So-Siz incl.
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shall enter such judgment or make such order as might lawfully be
made in the absence of such act."
In proceedings under the act in which it is necessary to prove that
a person is or is not in the military service a certificate signed by the
Adjutant General of the Army, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation
of the Navy Department, or the Major General Commandant of the
Marine Corps is prima facie evidence. 2
Shortcomings of the Act
In the haste of enactment of this act by Congress, certain matters
apparently have not been thoroughly considered. It is doubtful if the
act accomplishes all that was intended. "To suspend enforcement of
civil liabilities, in certain cases, of persons in the military service of the
United States in order to enable such persons to devote their entire
energy to the defense needs of the Nation" are the words found in the
first section of the law. The act fails to make any provision for depend-
ents forced to maintain themselves on an income of approximately thirty
dollars a month,"' which most of the men in the ranks will receive.
(This assumes that the person in the service sends his entire earnings
home.) It is true that the officers will receive a sufficient amount to
provide for their dependents, in some instances probably more than their
ordinary income, but it is not these who will constitute the serious
economic problem. The problem concerns the men in the ranks. There
is also a failure to do anything about the plight of the professional or
small-business man whose success depends upon his personal attention.
The fairness of the provisions making it necessary that the trainee pay
off his over-due obligations within three months is questionable."" This
period might well be two years, or there might be a provision that the
courts could provide for installment payments as a matter of discretion
after the termination of the enlistment. In view of the practical diffi-
culties involved in getting back to work, it appears very unlikely that the
ordinary laborer, and particularly the drafted one, will be able in three
months to provide for himself and family a financial readjustment after
being away a whole year. Another shortcoming of the act is that its
provisions apply only to installment contracts on which deposits or install-
ments have been paid on or before October 17, 1940. Is it to be
expected that all those subject to call will cease buying on the installment
plan on October 17, 1940? The provisions with regard to mortgage
aSec. 6o.
Sec. 6ox.
' For the first four months of training most men in the ranks will receive only
$zz per month.
,, This is the usual period; there are some exceptions.
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foreclosures are similarly inadequate, since the benefits of the act extend
only to those contracts in existence prior to October 17, 1 940. Further-
more, the act fails to mention foreclosure by entry and possession and
statutory foreclosure by advertisement and sale.45 Not much is offered
in the way of protection for life insurance policy holders, since the act
doesn't apply if fifty per cent or more of the loan value of the policy
has already been borrowed. If there is fifty per cent of the loan value
left, it would generally be sufficient to carry the policy for the year
regardless of this law. The act would be beneficial to holders of new
policies because their policies' loan values would be low, but to practically
all others nothing advantageous is gained under the act. Moreover, the
act applies to a maximum of $5,000 insurance. The section on taxes
provides for deferment of real property and income taxes during the
period of military service, but personal property taxes are entirely disre-
garded. Either more adequate compensation should be paid by the
government or further protection ought to be granted. In the interest
of justice to the man in the service and of high morale in the ranks,
these shortcomings in the present act provide reason enough for the
enactment of remedial legislation. H. M. M.
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
JOINDER OF NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff alleged in his petition that he sustained damage as a result
of injuries to his wife which she was alleged to have received through
the combined negligence of the defendants. The negligence charged
against the father, Harry Seff, was that he permitted his minor son to
operate his automobile contrary to a city ordinance of Akron. The
negligence charged against Robert Seff, a minor, was that he violated a
city ordinance in the manner in which he made a left hand turn and
also that he failed to keep a look out and to control the speed of the car.
Each of the defendants demurred to the petition on the grounds of
misjoinder of parties. Held: That the two defendants were properly
joined in the same action.1
As a general rule, a party suing in tort has the right to join or not
to join the different joint tort-feasors as parties to his action for dam-
ages.2 The reason for this is that a liability in tort is joint and several. 3
45 Under a similar provision in the Act of x918 it has been held that foreclosure by
entry and possession and statutory foreclosure by advertisement and sale were not pre-
vented by the federal law. Bell v. Buffington, 244 Mass. z94, 137 N.E. 287 (1923);
Taylor v. McGregor State Bank, 144 Minn. Z49, 174 N.W. 893 (1919), diclum..
1 Wery v. Seff, 136 Ohio St. 307, 25 N.E._(zd) 69z (1940).
2 Brownfield v. Clapham, z5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 443, Z7 Ohio C.D. 424 (g 16).
3Lindemann v. Eyrich, 2! Ohio App. 314, 153 N.E. 2z (1926).
